Source: OJ L 2024/2847, 20.11.2024Current language: EN
- Cyber resilience for products with digital elements
Basic legislative acts
- CRA regulation
Article 16 Establishment of a single reporting platform
For the purposes of the notifications referred to in Article 14(1) and (3) and Article 15(1) and (2) and in order to simplify the reporting obligations of manufacturers, a single reporting platform shall be established by ENISA. The day-to-day operations of that single reporting platform shall be managed and maintained by ENISA. The architecture of the single reporting platform shall allow Member States and ENISA to put in place their own electronic notification end-points.
After receiving a notification, the CSIRT designated as coordinator initially receiving the notification shall, without delay, disseminate the notification via the single reporting platform to the CSIRTs designated as coordinators on the territory of which the manufacturer has indicated that the product with digital elements has been made available.
In exceptional circumstances and, in particular, upon request by the manufacturer and in light of the level of sensitivity of the notified information as indicated by the manufacturer under Article 14(2), point (a), of this Regulation, the dissemination of the notification may be delayed based on justified cybersecurity-related grounds for a period of time that is strictly necessary, including where a vulnerability is subject to a coordinated vulnerability disclosure procedure as referred to in Article 12(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. Where a CSIRT decides to withhold a notification, it shall immediately inform ENISA about the decision and provide both a justification for withholding the notification as well as an indication of when it will disseminate the notification in accordance with the dissemination procedure laid down in this paragraph. ENISA may support the CSIRT on the application of cybersecurity-related grounds in relation to delaying the dissemination of the notification.
In particularly exceptional circumstances, where the manufacturer indicates in the notification referred to in Article 14(2), point (b):
that the notified vulnerability has been actively exploited by a malicious actor and, according to the information available, it has been exploited in no other Member State than the one of the CSIRT designated as coordinator to which the manufacturer has notified the vulnerability;
that any immediate further dissemination of the notified vulnerability would likely result in the supply of information the disclosure of which would be contrary to the essential interests of that Member State; or
that the notified vulnerability poses an imminent high cybersecurity risk stemming from the further dissemination;
only the information that a notification was made by the manufacturer, the general information about the product, the information on the general nature of the exploit and the information that security related grounds were raised are to be made available simultaneously to ENISA until the full notification is disseminated to the CSIRTs concerned and ENISA. Where, based on that information, ENISA considers that there is a systemic risk affecting security in the internal market, it shall recommend to the recipient CSIRT that it disseminate the full notification to the other CSIRTs designated as coordinators and to ENISA itself.
After receiving a notification of an actively exploited vulnerability in a product with digital elements or of a severe incident having an impact on the security of a product with digital elements, the CSIRTs designated as coordinators shall provide the market surveillance authorities of their respective Member States with the notified information necessary for the market surveillance authorities to fulfil their obligations under this Regulation.
ENISA shall take appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of the single reporting platform and the information submitted or disseminated via the single reporting platform. It shall notify without undue delay any security incident affecting the single reporting platform to the CSIRTs network as well as to the Commission.
ENISA, in cooperation with the CSIRTs network, shall provide and implement specifications on the technical, operational and organisational measures regarding the establishment, maintenance and secure operation of the single reporting platform referred to in paragraph 1, including at least the security arrangements related to the establishment, operation and maintenance of the single reporting platform, as well as the electronic notification end-points set up by the CSIRTs designated as coordinators at national level and ENISA at Union level, including procedural aspects to ensure that, where a notified vulnerability has no corrective or mitigating measures available, information about that vulnerability is shared in line with strict security protocols and on a need-to-know basis.
Where a CSIRT designated as coordinator has been made aware of an actively exploited vulnerability as part of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure procedure as referred to in Article 12(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the CSIRT designated as coordinator initially receiving the notification may delay the dissemination of the relevant notification via the single reporting platform based on justified cybersecurity-related grounds for a period that is no longer than is strictly necessary and until consent for disclosure by the involved coordinated vulnerability disclosure parties is given. That requirement shall not prevent manufacturers from notifying such a vulnerability on a voluntary basis in accordance with the procedure laid down in this Article.
Relevant recitals
Recital 65 Simultaneous notifications to CSIRT and ENISA
Manufacturers should notify simultaneously via the single reporting platform both the computer security incident response team (CSIRT) designated as coordinator as well as ENISA of actively exploited vulnerabilities contained in products with digital elements, as well as severe incidents having an impact on the security of those products. The notifications should be submitted using the electronic notification end-point of a CSIRT designated as coordinator and should be simultaneously accessible to ENISA.
Recital 69 Single reporting platform and biennal report
To ensure that notifications can be disseminated quickly to all relevant CSIRTs designated as coordinators and to enable manufacturers to submit a single notification at each stage of the notification process, a single reporting platform with national electronic notification end-points should be established by ENISA. The day-to-day operations of the single reporting platform should be managed and maintained by ENISA. The CSIRTs designated as coordinators should inform their respective market surveillance authorities about notified vulnerabilities or incidents. The single reporting platform should be designed in such a way that it ensures the confidentiality of notifications, in particular as regards vulnerabilities for which a security update is not yet available. In addition, ENISA should put in place procedures to handle information in a secure and confidential manner. On the basis of the information it gathers, ENISA should prepare a biennial technical report on emerging trends regarding cybersecurity risks in products with digital elements and submit it to the Cooperation Group established pursuant to Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555.
Recital 70 Delayed dissemination of notifications
In exceptional circumstances and in particular upon request by the manufacturer, the CSIRT designated as coordinator initially receiving a notification should be able to decide to delay its dissemination to the other relevant CSIRTs designated as coordinators via the single reporting platform where this can be justified on cybersecurity-related grounds and for a period of time that is strictly necessary. The CSIRT designated as coordinator should immediately inform ENISA about the decision to delay and on which grounds, as well as when it intends to disseminate further. The Commission should develop, through a delegated act, specifications on the terms and conditions for when cybersecurity-related grounds could be applied and should cooperate with the CSIRTs network established pursuant to Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, and ENISA in preparing the draft delegated act. Examples of cybersecurity-related grounds include an ongoing coordinated vulnerability disclosure procedure or situations in which a manufacturer is expected to provide a mitigating measure shortly and the cybersecurity risks of an immediate dissemination via the single reporting platform outweigh its benefits. If requested by the CSIRT designated as coordinator, ENISA should be able to support that CSIRT on the application of cybersecurity-related grounds in relation to delaying the dissemination of the notification based on the information ENISA has received from that CSIRT on the decision to withhold a notification on those cybersecurity-related grounds. Furthermore, in particularly exceptional circumstances, ENISA should not receive all the details of a notification of an actively exploited vulnerability in a simultaneous manner. This would be the case when the manufacturer marks in its notification that the notified vulnerability has been actively exploited by a malicious actor and that, according to the information available, it has been exploited in no other Member State than the one of the CSIRT designated as coordinator to which the manufacturer has notified the vulnerability, when any immediate further dissemination of the notified vulnerability would likely result in the supply of information the disclosure of which would be contrary to the essential interests of that Member State, or when the notified vulnerability poses an imminent high cybersecurity risk stemming from the further dissemination. In such cases, ENISA will only receive simultaneous access to the information that a notification was made by the manufacturer, general information about the product with digital elements concerned, the information about the general nature of the exploit and information about the fact that those security grounds were raised by the manufacturer and that the full content of the notification is therefore withheld. The full notification should then be made available to ENISA and other relevant CSIRTs designated as coordinators when the CSIRT designated as coordinator initially receiving the notification finds that those security grounds, reflecting particularly exceptional circumstances as established in this Regulation, cease to exist. Where, based on the information available, ENISA considers that there is a systemic risk affecting the security of the internal market, ENISA should recommend to the recipient CSIRT to disseminate the full notification to the other CSIRTs designated as coordinators and to ENISA itself.
Recital 72 National entry points for reporting
In order to simplify the reporting of information required under this Regulation, in consideration of other complementary reporting requirements laid down in Union law, such as Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council(25)Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011 (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 1)., Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(26)Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37). and Directive (EU) 2022/2555, as well as to decrease the administrative burden for entities, Member States are encouraged to consider providing at national level single entry points for such reporting requirements. The use of such national single entry points for the reporting of security incidents under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC should not affect the application of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, in particular those relating to the independence of the authorities referred to therein. When establishing the single reporting platform referred to in this Regulation, ENISA should take into account the possibility for the national electronic notification end-points referred to in this Regulation to be integrated into national single entry points that may also integrate other notifications required under Union law.
Recital 73 ENISA to consult other reporting platforms
When establishing the single reporting platform referred to in this Regulation and in order to benefit from past experience, ENISA should consult other Union institutions or agencies that are managing platforms or databases subject to stringent security requirements, such as the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA). ENISA should also analyse potential complementarities with the European vulnerability database established pursuant to Article 12(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555.
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